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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FOLLOW THE TEACHER’S ADVICE: RESOLVING
WEAST v. SCHAFFER: BURDEN SHOULD SHIFT FROM SCHOOL
SYSTEM TO PARENT TO PROVE THE INADEQUACY OF
DISABLED CHILD’S IEP

I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),1 Congress
provides federal grants to states that furnish “free appropriate public
education” (FAPE) to children with disabilities, whose impairments adversely
affect their educational performance.2 Pursuant to the Act, students with
disabilities must receive appropriate special education and related services
specifically designed to meet their unique needs.3 A state is only eligible for
federal assistance if the state demonstrates to the satisfaction of its secretary of
state that it has implemented policies and procedures that ensure that its
disabled students receive FAPE.4 Congress enacted the IDEA to guarantee an

1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–87 (2000), amended by Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004).
2. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). According to the IDEA, a “child with disability” is defined as a
child
with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language
impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional
disturbance[,] . . . orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and . . . who, by reason thereof, needs
special education and related services.
See id. § 1401(3)(A).
3. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982). The Rowley interpretation of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 has since been followed by later courts’
interpretation of the more modern IDEA. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 455 (4th Cir.
2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). As this Article was being completed, in December 2004 Congress
passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act to amend the IDEA. Pub. L.
No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647. As of July 1, 2005, section 1412 of the IDEA now reads:
A State is eligible for assistance under this part for a fiscal year if the State submits a plan
that provides assurances to the Secretary that the State has in effect policies and
procedures to ensure that the State meets each of the following conditions: . . . A free
appropriate public education is available to all children with disabilities residing in the
State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive, including children with disabilities who
have been suspended or expelled from school.
223
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improvement in educational results for disabled children, noting that such
development was an “essential element” of the “national policy of ensuring
Congress
equality of opportunity” for individuals with disabilities.5
recognized that disability should not diminish the right of individuals to
participate in or contribute to society.6
Although the IDEA seeks to provide disabled students with opportunities
for success, the Act unfortunately leaves unanswered the question of how
school officials must enforce its provisions. Consequently, parents, teachers,
and courts all may interpret the Act’s directive differently. As the First Circuit
points out, “[T]he IDEA is not self-executing, and parents, school officials,
bureaucrats, and judges alike have struggled to master its intricacies.”7 Still,
the IDEA does prescribe some procedural guidance with respect to
enforcement of the FAPE obligation, the most notable being the individualized
education program (IEP).8 Under the IEP requirement, the disabled child’s
parents and educators must create a written statement outlining the student’s
present level of educational performance, the student’s educational goals, and
the special education and related services that the school district will provide to
the child.9 The IEP must be “tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped
child . . . .”10 If a party is not satisfied with the proposed IEP, that party is
entitled to challenge the IEP’s adequacy by initiating a state-prescribed
administrative proceeding known as a due process hearing.11 The losing party

Id. (emphasis added). Like the earlier version of the IDEA, the 2004 amendments still identify
limited circumstances whereby some students, ages 3 through 5 and 18 through 21, may be
excluded from the provisions of the Act. Id.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1).
6. Id. § 1400(c)(1).
7. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. R., 321 F.3d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 2003).
8. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 (“The ‘free appropriate public education’ required by the
Act is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an ‘individualized
educational program . . . .’”); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (labeling the IEP as the
“primary vehicle for implementing . . . congressional goals”); Weast, 377 F.3d at 450 (noting that
“the IDEA requires every public school system receiving federal funds to develop and implement
an [IEP] for each disabled child in its jurisdiction” as a means of enforcing its directive that each
disabled child receive free appropriate pubic education); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204,
1213 n.16 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing the IEP as the “centerpiece” of the IDEA); LAWRENCE M.
SIEGEL, THE COMPLETE IEP GUIDE: HOW TO ADVOCATE FOR YOUR SPECIAL ED CHILD 2/3 (1st
ed. 1999) (explaining that under the IDEA, “the program and services [a] child needs (the ‘what’
and ‘where’) will be determined through the . . . IEP process”); see also Perry A. Zirkel, OverDue Process Revisions for the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 55 MONT. L. REV.
403, 403 (1994).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)–(B).
10. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181.
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). At the hearing, the administrative law judge is empowered to issue
binding decisions. Id. § 1415(i)(1)(A). In the year 2000, of the 11,068 hearings requested, over
3000 were heard. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF
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at the hearing can then seek relief in state or federal court by challenging the
findings of the administrative law judge (ALJ).12
Litigation in the special education sector often centers on the adequacy of a
disabled student’s special education.13 Until recently, a major debate split the
federal circuits: which party must carry the burden of proving the substantive
appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of a disabled child’s free public
education?14 The Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits assigned the burden of proof
at the state administrative level to the parents or the challenging party, while
the Second, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits (and perhaps the D.C. Circuit)

FORMAL DISPUTES ARE GENERALLY LOW AND STATES ARE USING MEDIATION AND OTHER
STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS 12 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03897.pdf.
Attorney Lawrence M. Siegel lists five considerations parents should consider before filing for a
due process hearing: the precise nature of their child’s problem, the importance of the issue to
their child, the strength of their case, the bottom line concerns for the school district, and the cost
of going forward. SIEGEL, supra note 8, at 12/7–12/8.
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
13. SUSAN GORN, THE ANSWER BOOK ON SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 3:6 (1996).
14. See Weast, 377 F.3d at 452 (noting that the circuits are “split—and splintered in
reasoning” on the question of how to allocate the burden of proof in state administrative
proceedings initiated by parents to challenge an IEP). Specifically, the question presented to the
Supreme Court was:
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, when parents of a disabled child
and a local school district reach an impasse over the child’s individualized education
program either side has a right to bring the dispute to the administrative hearing officer
for resolution. At the hearing, which side has the burden of proof—the parents or the
school district?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schaffer v. Weast, 125 S.Ct. 1300 (No. 04-698), 2004 WL
2700081.
In order for courts to resolve substantive inquiries into the adequacy of a child’s
education, the courts first needed to assign the burden of proof as a matter of law. See id. at 452;
Brian S. v. Vance, 86 F. Supp. 2d 538, 540 (D. Md. 2000), vacated, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v.
Vance, No. 00-1471, 2001 WL 22920, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 2001); see also Anne E. Johnson,
Evening the Playing Field: Tailoring the Allocation of the Burden of Proof at IDEA Due Process
Hearings to Balance Children’s Rights and Schools’ Needs, 46 B.C. L. REV. 591, 594 (2005)
(“Resolution of [the burden allocation] issue is necessary for the IDEA’s continued effectiveness
because the due process hearing is among its most fundamental procedural safeguards. At these
hearings, the allocation of the burden of proof often determines the outcome . . . .”).
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placed the burden on the school system.15 The First Circuit allocated the
burden to the party seeking to challenge the status quo.16
In 2004, the Fourth Circuit in Weast v. Schaffer17 first confronted the
question.18 The court ruled that there is “no valid reason to depart from the
general rule that the party initiating a proceeding has the burden of
proof . . . .”19 In November 2005, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth
Circuit’s decision, holding that “that the burden lies, as it typically does, on the
party seeking relief.”20 Hence, parents wishing to prove that their school
district violated their child’s right to receive FAPE carry the burden of proving
that the school district failed to propose and implement an adequate IEP for the
child.
This Note will analyze the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Weast, as well as
decisions from the other federal circuits explaining their respective positions
on the burden-placement issue. Ultimately, this Note will explain why the
Supreme Court should have declared a new burden-shifting approach in IEP
challenges: At due process hearings, school districts should carry an initial
burden of production, but the party challenging the adequacy of the IEP should
shoulder the ultimate burden of persuasion; the party challenging the ALJ’s
due process determination should then bear the entire burden of proof in
federal court.21 Part II of this Note will open by detailing the history of

15. Id. at 452–53; see Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153,
1158 (5th Cir. 1986); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 1998); Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533 (3d Cir.
1995); E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998); Clyde K. v. Puyallup
Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1532
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (placing burden on school system where parents challenge IEP as being
procedurally deficient).
16. Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 917 (1st Cir. 1983).
17. 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004).
18. Id. at 452. The Fourth Circuit reiterated its Weast holding in JH ex rel. JD v. Henrico
County School Board, 395 F.3d 185, 195 n.7 (4th Cir. 2005).
19. Weast, 377 F.3d at 450. For a recent review criticizing the Weast decision, see Disability
Law—Individuals with Disabilities Act—Fourth Circuit Holds that Parents Bear the Burden of
Proof in Due Process Hearing Against a School District—Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th
Cir. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 1078 (2005).
20. Weast v. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. 528, 531 (2005). This Note was written prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision. The following analysis does not include reference to the Supreme
Court’s reasoning, but rather is a response to the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Weast. This Note
offers an approach that differs from the Supreme Court’s decision to place the entire burden of
proof on the challenging party.
21. For a recent note responding to the Fourth Circuit Weast ruling, but advocating for a
different burden-shifting analysis, see Johnson, supra note 14. Johnson argues that the burden
allocation should depend on whether the issue in dispute is procedural or substantive. Id. at 621–
23.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

FOLLOW THE TEACHER’S ADVICE

227

Congressional regulation in the special education sector. Then, Part II will
discuss the substantive and procedural requirements the IDEA imposes upon
state public education systems. Next, Part III will elaborate on the meaning of
“burden of proof” in administrative proceedings and the consequences of
assigning the burden to different parties. Part III will then review the cases
that outlined their respective circuit’s approach to the issue. Part IV will
examine the factual background of Weast, the rule and rationale announced by
the Fourth Circuit, and the dissent’s countervailing arguments. Finally, Part V
will analyze both sides of the argument and declare why the Supreme Court
should issue this new burden-shifting approach. Part V will also identify how
the recent December 2004 amendments to the IDEA have contributed to this
Author’s reasoning.
II. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
A.

History and Purpose of Congressional Involvement

Prior to the 1960s, state statutes permitted and courts upheld the exclusion
of students with disabilities from public schools.22 Following the 1954
landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education,23 which held racial
segregation of public schools to be unconstitutional,24 parents of students with
disabilities and disability interest groups began demanding equal educational
opportunities for disabled students.25 The first legislative step taken by
Congress to address the needs of disabled children occurred in 1966 when
Congress amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 196526 to
“establish a grant program ‘for the purpose of assisting the States in the
initiation, expansion, and improvement of programs and projects . . . for the
Whether a new allocation is produced through Supreme Court review or by Congress’s
amendment of the IDEA, a modified burden-shifting scheme would best mirror the
IDEA’s delicate balancing of the rights of disabled children and the need to impose a
realistic mandate on school districts. Consistent with traditional evidentiary principles,
the party challenging the status quo should bear the burden of proof on all substantive
issues. On procedural issues, however, the school districts should bear the burden of
proof to better respond to the IDEA’s remedial purpose and its premium on procedural
compliance.
Id. at 622–23.
22. Cory L. Shindel, One Standard Fits All? Defining Achievement Standards for Students
With Cognitive Disabilities Within the No Child Left Behind Act’s Standardized Framework, 12
J.L. & POL’Y 1025, 1033–34 (2004); see also Gary L. Monserud, The Quest for a Meaningful
Mandate for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
675, 683 (2004).
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
25. Shindel, supra note 22, at 1034.
26. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
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education of handicapped children.’”27 In 1970, Congress passed the
Education of the Handicapped Act,28 effectively replacing the 1966 program.29
The 1966 and 1970 enactments attempted to stimulate the states to develop
educational resources and special teacher training for students with
disabilities.30 In November 1975, Congress passed the predecessor to the
IDEA: the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).31
At the time, Congress was concerned that the majority of disabled children in
the United States were not receiving appropriate educational services, thus
being denied full equality of opportunity.32 Additionally, Congress feared that
many disabled children were prevented from having a successful educational
experience because their disabilities were undetected.33
Eventually, aiming for stronger and more effective legislation, on June 4,
1997, Congress enacted the IDEA as amendments to the EAHCA.34 Congress
recognized that implementation of the EAHCA had been “successful in
ensuring children with disabilities and the families of such children access to a

27. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179–80 (1982) (quoting the Elementary and
Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204).
28. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970).
29. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180.
30. Id.
31. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1491o
(2000)).
32. Id. § 3.
33. Id. When Congress passed the EAHCA, 1.75 million disabled children were out of
school and 2.5 million disabled students were receiving education inappropriate for their unique
disability. Mark C. Weber, Litigation Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act After
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 357, 359–60 (2004). Ultimately, Congress declared:
State and local educational agencies have a responsibility to provide education for all
handicapped children, but present financial resources are inadequate to meet the special
educational needs of handicapped children; and . . . it is in the national interest that the
Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the
educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the
law. . . . It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all handicapped children have
available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the
rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States
and localities to provide for the education of all handicapped children, and to assess and
assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children.
§ 3, 89 Stat. at 775 (emphasis added).
34. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–
1491o (2000)). In 1991, earlier amendments to the EAHCA had changed the statute’s name to
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Pub. L. No. 102-119, 105 Stat. 587; see M.
LOUISE LANTZY, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO
ITS LITERATURE AND RESOURCES, 1980–1991, at 13–18 (1992) (discussing a brief overview of
the statutory evolution of disability law through 1991).
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free appropriate public education and in improving educational results for
children with disabilities.”35 Congress remained dissatisfied with the low
expectations that the EAHCA maintained for disabled students.36 Congress
determined that even after more than twenty years of executing the EAHCA,
further advancement in the field of special education remained possible.37
Indeed, the IDEA articulates the need for “strengthening the role of parents and
ensuring that families of such children have meaningful opportunities to
participate in the education of their children at school and at home.”38
Congress recognized that students’ special education must actually provide a
beneficial service, “rather than a place where they are sent.”39
With the passage of the IDEA, Congress sought to make certain that all
disabled students receive FAPE and necessary related services and to “ensure
that the rights of the children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected.”40 Congress announced that federal, state, and local officials must
all participate in assisting children with special educational needs.41 The IDEA
purports to guarantee that both parents and educators are equipped to help
improve the education of disabled children.42
As mentioned earlier, Congress created the IEP requirement as the
procedural method for such a guarantee.43 The following Section discusses
this obligation.
B.

Implementing the FAPE Requirement Through the IEP

The IDEA promises to disabled children a “free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent
living.”44 These educational services must be provided in the least restrictive

35. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3).
36. Id. § 1400(c)(4) (explaining that “implementation of [the EAHCA] has been impeded by
low expectations, and an insufficient focus on applying replicable research on proven methods of
teaching and learning for children with disabilities”).
37. Id. § 1400(c)(5).
38. Id. § 1400(c)(5)(B).
39. Id. § 1400(c)(5)(C).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)–(B). For many students, eligibility for special education
means the difference between receiving essential services at public expense or nothing at all.
Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 441, 443 (2004).
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(C).
42. Id. § 1400(d)(3).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 8–10.
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). For a detailed analysis of the IDEA’s directives, see
Monserud, supra note 22, at 691–700. Professor Monserud classifies the IDEA into six major
concepts: (1) FAPE, (2) the IEP, (3) a least restrictive environment, (4) related services, (5) due
process, and (6) judicial review. Id. at 691.
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environment; in other words, to the maximum extent appropriate, disabled
students are to be educated alongside non-disabled students.45 In Rowley, the
Supreme Court expounded on the meaning of free appropriate public education
under the IDEA’s predecessor, the EAHCA. According to the Court, FAPE is
statutorily defined as special education and related services that “(A) have been
provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C)
include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in
the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program . . . .”46 The Rowley Court interpreted the FAPE
requirement to connote “educational instruction specially designed to meet the
unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are
necessary to permit the child ‘to benefit’ from the instruction.”47
Rowley identified a two-step process courts should undertake in
guaranteeing that a student receives FAPE: (1) determine whether the school
system procedurally followed the IDEA’s directives, and then (2) determine
whether the student’s IEP is reasonably calculated to ensure substantively
appropriate education.48 To ensure that public schools supply FAPE to their
disabled students, the IDEA sets up a process whereby educators and parents
together agree on the services to be provided each individual student, i.e.,
services that constitute the IEP.49 Courts may analyze the appropriateness of
the disabled student’s education by reviewing whether the IEP is procedurally
or substantively flawed.
The Supreme Court notes that inquiries into whether school districts
comply with the procedural obligations placed upon them can evidence the
substantive adequacy of an IEP.50 Procedurally, the Court points out that a

45. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“[S]pecial classes, separate schooling, or other removal of
children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature
or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”).
46. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188 (1982) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18)).
47. Id. at 188–89. The educational instruction must only be sufficient to confer some
educational benefit upon the child with disability. Id. at 200. In fact, Congress did not intend to
require schools to provide instruction that maximizes each disabled child’s potential. Id. at 199.
48. Id. at 206–07.
[A] court’s inquiry in suits brought under [the IDEA] is twofold. First, has the State
complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized
educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the State
has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no
more.
Id.
49. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
50. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
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child’s education can be checked for appropriateness by validating that certain
criteria are met: the special instruction and services are paid for by public
expenditure, are provided under public supervision, meet the state’s
educational standards, comport with the grade levels used by the state for
regular education, and comport with the child’s IEP.51 “Thus, if personalized
instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the
child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional
checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a ‘free appropriate public
education’ as defined by the Act.”52
It is significant to note specifically several of the procedural obligations the
IDEA imposes during the creation of an appropriate IEP for a disabled student.
For instance, before completing an IEP, school officials must provide notice
and either receive informed consent from the student’s parents or utilize a due
process hearing or mediation.53 Also, when conducting an evaluation of the
child, educators must incorporate several assessment tools and strategies,
including information provided by the parent.54 School officials must ensure
that the selected tests are not discriminatory or racially or culturally based.55
Where feasible, the evaluations must be administered in the child’s native
language or mode of communication.56 School evaluators, when giving
standardized tests, must guarantee that the tests are administered in accordance
with the instructions provided by the tests’ producers.57 With regard to the IEP
itself, school officials must provide a written statement of the child’s present
levels of educational performance and the special services to be provided.58

We think that the congressional emphasis upon full participation of concerned parties
throughout the development of the IEP, as well as the requirements that state and local
plans be submitted to the Secretary for approval, demonstrates the legislative conviction
that adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure
much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.
Id.; see also McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The underlying
assumption of the Act is that to the extent its procedural mechanisms are faithfully employed,
handicapped children will be afforded an appropriate education.”).
51. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188–89. For an early critique of the IDEA’s reliance on procedural
benchmarks as a measure of the substantive appropriateness of an IEP, see David M. Engel, Law,
Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of Difference,
1991 DUKE L.J. 166.
52. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189.
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)–(c) (2000), amended by Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–446, § 614, 118 Stat. 2647, 2704–07.
54. Id. § 1414(c)(1), amended by § 614, 118 Stat. at 2706.
55. Id. § 1414(b)(3)(A), amended by § 614, 118 Stat. at 2705.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A), amended by § 614, 118 Stat. at 2707–08. This written
statement must include how the child’s disability affects her involvement and progress in the
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The IEP team, empowered to create a student’s IEP, must be comprised of the
child’s parents, at least one regular education teacher of such child, at least one
special education teacher, a representative of the local educational agency, and
at the discretion of the parent or the agency, others with knowledge or special
expertise regarding the child.59 Additionally, if appropriate, the disabled child
may also participate in the IEP team.60
When parents become dissatisfied with a proposed IEP for their child, as a
first step the parents could attack the IEP for a procedural flaw. Generally,
proving a school district’s procedural misstep simply requires showing that the
school system failed to perform a requisite task when designing the IEP.
However, a school’s procedural mistakes do not automatically require a
finding that it denied a student FAPE.61 Still, when the school complies with
the IDEA’s procedural guidelines—or at least does not violate a student’s
guaranteed FAPE through enough procedural violations of the IDEA—parents
are left to dispute the more difficult issue, the substantive adequacy of their
child’s IEP. This was the factual scenario in Weast, where the parents
questioned the appropriateness of their son’s public school IEP by attacking
the substance of the special education to be provided.62 The legal issue that
arose involved which party carried the burden of proof in the dispute.63
III. BURDEN OF PROOF: WHERE DO THE DIFFERENT CIRCUITS PLACE THE
BURDEN?
A.

Definition of “Burden of Proof”

Before discussing why some circuits place the burden of proof on parents,
while others assign it to the school, it is significant to first mention the
definition of “burden of proof.” According to Black’s Law Dictionary, in a
civil case, a party’s burden of proof involves the “party’s duty to prove a

general curriculum, a description of annual goals, and a report of the special education, related
services, and supplementary aids to be provided to the child. Id.
59. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B), amended by § 614, 118 Stat. at 2709–10.
60. Id.
61. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that clear denial of
FAPE does result from procedural inadequacies that create loss of educational opportunity or that
seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process). In fact,
the recent amendments to the IDEA have actually eliminated decisions by hearing officials based
solely on procedural errors where the flaws do not adversely affect the implementation of the IEP.
See NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2004: EXPANDED AUTHORITY TO LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS: A QUICK
REFERENCE GUIDE FOR LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS (2005), http://www.nsba.org/site/
docs/34900/34889.pdf.
62. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
63. Id. at 452.
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disputed assertion or charge.”64 For example, in Weast, determining who
carries the burden of proof means determining which party maintains the duty
to prove the charge of inadequate (or adequate) special education and related
services. The Supreme Court has held that the modern definition of “burden of
proof” includes a party’s burden of production and burden of persuasion.65
The determination of which party carries the burden of proof may play a
major role in the outcome of the due process hearing. For instance, the party
with the burden of production will lose when that party fails to produce any
evidence on the issue.66 The burden of persuasion becomes a factor when both
parties have introduced all of their evidence, meeting their burdens of
production.67 In a trial without a jury—as will be the case in due process
hearings before an ALJ— “[i]f. . . the judge is in doubt, the issue must be
decided against the party having the burden of persuasion.”68 Thus, the party
with the burden of persuasion loses if both parties put forth equal evidence.
It makes sense that in an adversarial setting, a party will want the opponent
to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion. After all, carrying the burden means
risking loss where the trier of fact is not persuaded by either party’s evidence.
Nevertheless, the federal circuits did not provide a consensus as to which party
should bear the burden of proof in an IEP dispute. Below, this Note analyzes
the majority and minority approaches to assigning the burden of proof in such
proceedings.
B.

Majority: Jurisdictions That Assign Burden to School District

The majority of federal circuits placed the burden of proof at the
administrative hearing upon the school district to show that a disabled
student’s IEP appropriately provided special education and related services to

64. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (8th ed. 2004).
65. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 275–
76 (1994).
The emerging consensus on a definition of burden of proof was reflected in the evidence
treatises of the 1930’s and 1940’s. “The burden of proof is the obligation which rests on
one of the parties to an action to persuade the trier of the facts, generally the jury, of the
truth of a proposition which he has affirmatively asserted by the pleadings.” . . .
Accordingly, we conclude that as of 1946 the ordinary meaning of burden of proof was
burden of persuasion.
Id. (quoting WILLIAM PAYSON RICHARDSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 143 (6th ed. 1944)); see 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 425 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.1992) (“The term encompasses
two separate burdens of proof. One burden is that of producing evidence, satisfactory to the
judge, of a particular fact in issue. The second is the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
alleged fact is true.”).
66. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 65, at 425.
67. Id. at 426.
68. Id.
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the student.69 Some circuits shifted this burden to the losing party when that
party sought relief in federal court.70 The following Subsections identify the
leading cases in the respective circuits that placed the burden on the schools at
the due process hearing.
1.

Third Circuit

In Oberti v. Board of Education,71 the Third Circuit first stated its position
that the school district should maintain the burden of proof in a district court
challenge.72 The dispute in Oberti arose when parents of a child with Down’s
syndrome73 challenged a school district’s decision to exclude their child from a

69. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005). The
Supreme Court of New Jersey has also sided with the majority of federal circuits. Lascari v. Bd.
of Educ., 560 A.2d 1180, 1188 (N.J. 1989) (“[W]e believe it is more consistent with the State and
federal scheme to place the burden on the school district not only when it seeks to change the IEP,
but also when the parents seek the change.”). The New Jersey court’s reasoning was grounded in
the policy that prescribing appropriate education is not enough; the district must also be forced to
prove at a due process hearing the appropriateness of the IEP.
[T]he basic obligation to provide a handicapped child with a free, appropriate education is
placed on the local school district. It is the district that must identify handicapped
children and then formulate and implement their IEPs. . . . [T]he regulatory scheme vests
handicapped children and their parents with numerous procedural safeguards. . . . Like
those procedural safeguards, the allocation of the burden of proof protects the rights of
handicapped children to an appropriate education.
Our result is also consistent with the proposition that the burdens of persuasion and
of production should be placed on the party better able to meet those burdens.
Id.
70. See, e.g., Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991 (1st Cir. 1990)
(requiring complaining party to prove state agency’s decision to be wrong); Karl v. Bd. of Educ.,
736 F.2d 873, 877 (2nd Cir. 1984) (holding that deference should be given to state agency
findings); Spielberg v. Henrico County Pub. Sch., 853 F.2d 256, 258 n.2 (4th Cir. 1988) (placing
burden on party challenging state administrative decision); Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ.,
918 F.2d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that due deference should be granted to the state
administrative agency because the federal courts lack expertise with regard to children with
special needs); Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1991)
(requiring school board challenging administrative outcome to carry burden of proof); E.S. v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that party challenging
ruling of state administrative proceeding must shoulder burden of proof); Kerkam v. McKenzie,
862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (declaring losing party at administrative proceeding to face
burden of proof on appeal).
71. 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
72. Id. at 1218.
73. “Down’s syndrome” is defined as
a chromosomal dysgenesis syndrome consisting of a variable constellation of
abnormalities caused by triplication or translocation of chromosome 21.
The
abnormalities include mental retardation, retarded growth, flat hypoplastic face with short
nose, prominent epicanthic skin folds, small low-set ears with prominent antihelix,
fissured and thickened tongue, laxness of joint ligaments, pelvic dyslpasia, broad hands
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regular classroom, i.e., the school refused to mainstream their child.74 In
determining the disabled student’s right to be mainstreamed under the Act, the
court needed to establish which party had the burden of proving the
appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of the removal. The school board
carried the burden at the state administrative level and persuaded the ALJ that
the IEP’s call for removal was appropriate for the disabled student.75 As a
result, the school system argued that the parents should then be forced to bear
the burden of persuasion when challenging the ALJ’s determination in federal
court.76 The Third Circuit rejected this rationale and declared that the school
board has the burden in all proceedings regarding the substantive adequacy of
a student’s IEP.77
The Third Circuit recognized that the IDEA does not prescribe the burden
to either party, yet to the court, the Act still sheds light on where the burden
should be placed.78 Since the IDEA was enacted with an underlying concern
for the welfare of disabled children, the court explained, “Requiring parents to
prove . . . that the school has failed to comply with the Act would undermine
the Act’s express purpose ‘to assure that the rights of children with disabilities
and their parents are protected’. . . .”79 The court held that compelling parents
to prove the inadequacy of their child’s education would “diminish the effect
of the provision that enables parents and guardians to obtain judicial
enforcement of the Act’s substantive and procedural requirements.”80 Under
the IDEA, parents and students are guaranteed that the student will receive
appropriate public education.81 To the court, then, requiring parents to prove
that the services provided were not appropriate would undercut the Act’s
protection. The Oberti court also pointed to practical considerations in making
its determination: “[T]he school has an advantage when a dispute arises under
the Act: the school has better access to the relevant information, greater control
over the potentially more persuasive witnesses[,] . . . and greater overall

and feet, stubby fingers, and transverse palmer crease. Lenticular opacities and heart
disease are common. The incidence of leukemia is increased and Alzheimer’s disease is
almost inevitable by age 40.
STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1728 (26th ed. 1995).
74. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1206–07.
75. Id. at 1218.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1219 (“The district court can give due weight to the agency proceedings (i.e.,
refrain from imposing its own notions of educational policy on the states), while the ultimate
burden of proof remains on the school.”).
78. Id. at 1218. The court also noted that the landmark decision in Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176 (1982), did not address the burden of proof either. Id.
79. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1988)).
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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educational expertise than the parents.”82 Thus, the Third Circuit placed upon
the school district, as the expert and duty-bound party, the burden of upholding
its determination of an appropriate IEP at all proceedings.
2.

Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits

The Second Circuit never issued an opinion rationalizing why the circuit
assigned the burden of proof to the school system.83 Instead, in Walczak v.
Florida Union Free School District,84 the Second Circuit simply recognized
that the established law of the circuit held that a board of education shouldered
the burden of establishing the appropriateness of a disabled student’s IEP.85
The Eighth Circuit also assigned to the school district the burden of
persuasion at the administrative proceeding. In E.S. v. Independent School
District No. 196, 86 the court stated without explanation, “At the administrative
level, the [school district] clearly had the burden of proving that it had
complied with the IDEA.”87 However, the court, again without explanation,
took the opposite view of the Third Circuit with respect to the burden of proof
during appeals to federal court. The Eighth Circuit allowed the burden to shift
to the losing party, stating that “[o]n appeal, the party challenging the outcome
of state administrative hearings has the burden of proof.”88
In a case determining the placement of the burden of proof at the district
court level, the Ninth Circuit declared, “The school clearly had the burden of
proving at the administrative hearing that it complied with the IDEA.”89
Unfortunately, the opinion left no citation and no reasoning for this rule. But,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the general rule that “the party challenging an
agency’s decision bears the burden of proof” in federal court, specifically
rejecting the Third Circuit’s decision in Oberti.90
3.

D.C. Circuit

The D.C. Circuit did not assign the burden of proof to a specific party in
administrative hearings questioning the substantive adequacy of an IEP.91

82. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219.
83. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
84. 142 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 1998).
85. Id. at 122 (quoting In re a Handicapped Child, 22 Educ. Dep’t Rep. 487, 489 (1983) (“It
is well established that a board of education has the burden of establishing the appropriateness of
the placement recommended by [the school board.]”).
86. 135 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 1998).
87. Id. at 569. In E.S., the Eighth Circuit reviewed a district court’s affirmance of an ALJ’s
determination regarding the adequacy of a disabled child’s IEP. Id. at 568.
88. Id. at 569.
89. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
90. Id. at 1398–99.
91. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 452–53 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
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However, in McKenzie v. Smith,92 the D.C. Circuit emphasized the
responsibility of school districts to uphold the procedural guidelines imposed
under the Act.93 Later courts interpreted McKenzie to mean that in the D.C.
Circuit the school board carried the burden of proof in hearings where
In stating that
procedural violations of the IDEA were at issue.94
“responsibility for compliance with [the IDEA] remains with the public . . .
educational agency,” the McKenzie opinion gave strong language to support
this conclusion.95
In McKenzie, Smith, a learning disabled and emotionally troubled student,
attended private school for a number of years.96 Eventually, this school
determined that Smith needed to be placed in a new environment; the private
school drafted an IEP proposing that Smith attend another specialized private
school.97 Following a brief psychological interview, the D.C. public
educational system recommended that Smith’s IEP be changed so that he
attended public school.98 Believing a private environment to be more
appropriate, Smith’s parents then sought relief through a due process hearing.99
The ALJ concluded that the public school failed to provide an adequate IEP,
and the school appealed to court.100 After the district court affirmed the
hearing officer’s conclusions, the D.C. Circuit also affirmed, concluding that
the school system failed its procedural obligations.101 The D.C. Circuit found
the procedural violations serious enough to demonstrate a substantive violation
of the Act.102
A later D.C. Circuit case held that the circuit did not part from the
generally accepted principle that challenging parties bear the burden of proof
92. 771 F.2d 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 1532.
94. See Weast, 377 F.3d at 452–53.
95. McKenzie, 771 F.2d at 1531 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.347).
96. Id. at 1529. This private school education, though, had been approved by an IEP drawn
up by his local public school, and was thus funded by the public school system. Id.
97. Id. at 1529–30. The private school’s proposed IEP stated that Smith should be placed in
a “full-time residential placement designed to teach students whose primary handicap is learning
disabilities, but whose emotional overlay problems interfere with academic progress.” Id. at
1530.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. McKenzie, 771 F.2d at 1530.
101. Id. at 1531, 1535. According to the court, such procedural violations by the public
school district included failure to give a detailed rationale for its proposed IEP, failure to describe
options considered, and failure to list evaluation procedures, tests, records, or report. Id. at 1532–
33.
102. Id. at 1531 (“[The school district] did not comply with the procedural requirements of
the Act. Additionally, and partly as a consequence of this noncompliance, [the district] failed to
demonstrate that its proposed placement was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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in district court. “[W]e think it clear that a party challenging the administrative
determination must at least take on the burden of persuading the court that the
hearing officer was wrong, and that a court upsetting the officer’s decision
must at least explain its basis for doing so.”103 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit
never ruled directly on whether the school district or parent carried the burden
of proof in substantive challenges to a student’s IEP.
C. Minority: Jurisdictions That Assign Burden to Parents
At the time Weast v. Schaffer was decided in the Fourth Circuit, three other
federal circuits had been placing the burden on the challenging party to prove
the inappropriateness of the child’s public education.104 Below are the leading
cases from the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits and their rationales.
1.

Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit, in deference to the expertise of local school officials,
became the first circuit to assign the burden of proof to the party challenging
the adequacy of a disabled child’s IEP.105 In Tatro v. State of Texas,106 an
eight-year-old girl afflicted with spina bifida107 suffered from a neurogenic
bladder108 that did not allow her to control her bladder.109 As a result, she
needed to be catheterized several times daily to prevent damage to her
health.110 The child’s parents initiated a due process hearing to modify her IEP
to include Clean Intermittent Catheterization (CIC) as a “related service”

103. Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In reaching this conclusion,
the D.C. Circuit expressly rejected that McKenzie v. Smith always placed the burden of proof on
the school district in federal court.
McKenzie v. Smith . . . states that the [school authorities] “totally neglected its
obligation . . . to demonstrate that it could provide an appropriate placement for the
child.” This could be read as placing the burden on the school authorities regardless of
the hearing officer’s decision. But as the school authorities in Smith had lost before the
hearing officer, we think the case is more properly read as requiring the loser, as the
moving party, to shoulder the burden on appeal to the district court.
Id. (quoting McKenzie, 771 F.2d at 1534).
104. 377 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 2004).
105. Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Irving
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); see also Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State
Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158 (5th Cir. 1986).
106. 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983).
107. “Spina bifida” is defined as “embryologic failure of fusion of one or more vertebral
arches; subtypes of spina bifida are based upon degree and pattern of deformity associated with
neuroectoderm involvement.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 73, at 1649.
108. “Neurogenic bladder” is defined as “any defective functioning of bladder due to
impaired innervation. . . .” Id. at 209.
109. Tatro, 703 F.2d at 825.
110. Id.
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guaranteed under FAPE.111 After a court order modified the IEP to include
CIC, the school district challenged the revision.112 In reaching its conclusion
with regard to the school board’s petition, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that a
presumption existed in favor of the child’s IEP.113
As required under the IDEA, an IEP is designed through the collective
efforts of informed educators, parents, and occasionally medical personnel
familiar with the student.114 Accordingly, the court in Tatro announced,
“fairness requires that the party attacking its terms should bear the burden of
showing why the educational setting established by the IEP is not
appropriate.”115 Although the Supreme Court eventually overturned some of
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, the High Court did not discuss the issue of burden
placement.116 A few years later, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its stance that the
party challenging the adequacy of an IEP bears the burden of proof. In Alamo
Heights Independent School District,117 the Fifth Circuit cited the rationale
provided in Tatro for placing the burden of proof on the challenging party.118

111. Id.
112. Id. at 826. For the Supreme Court’s summary of the facts, see Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 885–88 (1984). Interestingly, in this case, the party attacking the proposed
IEP was the school district. Id. at 887–88. The procedural posture of the case is necessary to its
understanding. Initially, the parents challenged the school board’s decision not to offer CIC to
their daughter. Id. at 886–87. The Fifth Circuit eventually held such catheterization was justified
as a “related service” guaranteed under FAPE in limited circumstances. Id. at 887. On remand,
with this new interpretation of FAPE, the district court modified the girl’s IEP to include CIC. Id.
at 887–88. The school board then sought to change the IEP as modified. Id. at 888. Because the
school district did not want to cover the expense of catheterization, school officials sought to
change the IEP to have the disabled child receive private education where CIC was already
available. Tatro, 703 F.2d at 829. Hence, the burden was on the school district to prove the need
for such a change. Id. at 830. The court held that the school district did not meet its burden of
production. Id. (“Since the school district has not even attempted to do so, its argument must be
rejected and we need not reach the thorny issue of what circumstances might call for judicial
modification of an IEP.”)
113. Tatro, 703 F.2d at 830. Note that at this point, the IEP as it stood called for CIC to be
administered. See supra note 112.
114. Tatro, 703 F.2d at 830 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976)).
115. Id.
116. See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 468 U.S. 883.
117. 790 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1986).
118. See id. at 1158 (recognizing that the Fifth Circuit, post-Tatro, defers to the IDEA and
“the reliance it places on the expertise of local education authorities,” and places a presumption in
favor of the IEP’s placement decision by assigning to the party attacking its terms the burden of
proving the IEP’s inappropriateness).
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Sixth and Tenth Circuits

Under Cordrey v. Euckert119 and Doe v. Defendant,120 the Sixth Circuit
accepted the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that the attacking party must carry the
burden of proof when challenging an IEP.121 Doe marked the first time the
Sixth Circuit followed Tatro’s approach to the appropriateness of an IEP.122 In
Doe, the Sixth Circuit upheld a district court’s affirmation of an ALJ
determination that an IEP was adequate stating, “Appellant has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the IEP was inadequate. . . .
We agree with the ALJ and the District Court that appellant’s IEP was
calculated to allow him to receive educational benefit from the instruction.”123
The Tenth Circuit also followed the reasoning of the seminal Tatro ruling
in Johnson v. Independent School District No. 4.124 “The parties should note
that the burden of proof in these matters rests with the party attacking the
child’s individual education plan.”125 In Johnson, the Tenth Circuit trumpeted
the deference rationale for placing the burden on the challenger. The Tenth
Circuit created a presumption that favored the appropriateness of an IEP in
deference to the statutory scheme of the IDEA and “the reliance it places on
the expertise of local education authorities.”126
With the existing legal precedents in place in neighboring circuits, the
Fourth Circuit faced the issue of burden-placement in litigation questioning the
appropriateness of a child’s IEP in Weast v. Schaffer.
IV. A REVIEW OF THE WEAST APPROACH
A.

Weast Factual Background

The parents of Brian Schaffer, a middle-school student with learning
disabilities, initiated a due process hearing to challenge the IEP developed for
him by Maryland’s Montgomery County Public School System (MCPS).127
Beginning in pre-kindergarten until the seventh grade, Brian attended a private
119. 917 F.2d 1460 (6th Cir. 1990).
120. 898 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1990).
121. Cordrey, 917 F.2d at 1469 (“The party challenging the terms of an IEP should bear the
burden of proving that the educational placement established by the IEP is not appropriate.”);
Doe, 898 F.2d at 1191 (“Appellant has the burden of proving beyond a preponderance of the
evidence that the IEP was inadequate.”).
122. Cordrey, 917 F.2d at 1469 (explaining that the Sixth Circuit in Doe respected the Fifth
Circuit’s Tatro holding).
123. Doe, 898 F.2d at 1191.
124. 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990).
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158
(5th Cir. 1986)).
127. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 450 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
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school, Green Acres, in Montgomery County.128 However, Green Acres did
not maintain a special education program and Brian struggled academically.129
In October of Brian’s seventh grade year, Green Acres’ officials informed
Brian’s mother that he needed to attend a school that could better
accommodate his disabilities.130 Soon after, Brian’s mother requested that his
local MCPS school evaluate him to determine his eligibility for special
education services for the following academic year.131 Around this time,
Brian’s parents also applied to have him admitted to the McLean School of
Maryland, another private school.132
In February 1998, Brian’s parents, their lawyer, and MCPS school officials
met with the MCPS’s Admission, Review, and Dismissal (ARD)
Committee.133 In March, the McLean School accepted Brian for its upcoming
school year and Brian’s parents paid the enrollment fee to reserve his place.134
Then, in April, MCPS declared Brian eligible for special education and offered
an IEP for the 1998–1999 school year.135 Brian’s parents informed MCPS that
their son would be attending the McLean School because they believed
MCPS’s proposed IEP was inadequate to serve Brian’s needs.136
In the meantime, Brian’s parents requested a due process hearing to
challenge the appropriateness of the MCPS IEP and to recover the private
school tuition fees.137 At the hearing, the ALJ assigned Brian’s parents, as the

128. Id.
129. Id. In the fall of 1997, Brian began the seventh grade on academic probation at Green
Acres. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Weast, 377 F.3d at 450.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Under MCPS’s proposed IEP, Brian was eligible for 15.3 hours of special education
and 45 minutes of speech therapy at either his local public school or, alternatively, at another
nearby middle school. Id. at 450–51.
136. Id. at 451.
137. Weast, 377 F.3d at 451; see Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985)
(holding that school authorities must “reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special
education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a
proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.”); see also GORN, supra note 13, at 3:2 (noting that
sending a child to private school does not effectively waive that child’s right to receive FAPE if
the private school enrollment is triggered by the parent’s correct assertion that the child has not
been offered a public program that provides FAPE); William N. Myhill, Note, No FAPE for
Children with Disabilities in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program: Time to Redefine a Free
Appropriate Public Education, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2004) (“[F]ollowing a unilateral
withdrawal, if the parents are able to show that their child was not receiving a FAPE in the public
school, courts may order the public school system to bear part of or the entire cost.”).
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challenging party, the burden of proving the inadequacy of the IEP.138 The
ALJ reasoned that deference should be given to the school district in
determining a student’s required substantive support.139 On appeal by Brian’s
parents, the district court remanded, placing the burden on the school district to
substantiate its proposed IEP.140 In reaching its conclusion, the district court
expressed that such burden placement “in no way reflects a lack of deference
to the expertise of the school authorities.”141 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit
ultimately reversed the district court’s ruling and confirmed Fourth Circuit
precedent “that the party initiating a proceeding has the burden of proof.”142
B.

Rationale in Weast for Placing the Burden on Challenging Party

For the first time, a circuit court devoted its entire opinion to resolving the
issue of burden assignment in IEP-related due process hearings. The Weast
court appeared willing to place the burden with the school district if an
appropriate rationale could be shown. But, after a brief discussion of the other
circuits’ choices for burden placement, the court explained that because “the
decisions assigning the burden of proof at the administrative hearing to the
school system offer little or no analysis, they do not persuade us to depart from
the normal rule of allocating the burden to the party seeking relief.”143
The court began its analysis by responding to Brian’s parents’ argument
that the school district should bear the burden of proving the adequacy of an
IEP since the IDEA is a remedial statute that places many procedural
obligations on school systems.144 To Brian’s parents, carrying the burden of
proof was simply another of these obligations that the school must shoulder to
guarantee that a child receives FAPE.145 The court rejected this line of
reasoning and likened the IDEA to other remedial statutes that impose
affirmative obligations on employers, or others, but remain silent with regard
to burden of proof.146 The court noted that courts consistently place the burden

138. Weast, 377 F.3d at 451. The due process hearing took place over three days in June and
July 1998. Brian S. v. Vance, 86 F. Supp. 2d 538, 540 (D. Md. 2000), vacated, Schaffer ex rel.
Schaffer v. Vance, No. 00-1471, 2001 WL 22920, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 2001).
139. Weast, 377 F.3d at 451.
140. Id.; see Brian S., at 545 (“[W]ith regard to an initial IEP, experience and fairness dictate
that the school district should have the burden of proof at any administrative due process hearing
that might follow.”). The district court reached its conclusion after citing authority from the
circuits that placed the burden of proof on the school district at all times. Id. at 542–43.
141. Brian S., at 544.
142. Weast, 377 F.3d at 450.
143. Id. at 453
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. Id. (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000h-6
(2000), Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000), and Age
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on the party seeking the protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), not the party under orders.147
“Like the IDEA, these statutes are silent about burden of proof, yet we assign it
to the plaintiff who seeks the statutory protection or benefit; the burden is not
assigned to the party with the statutory obligation.”148 The Fourth Circuit
noted that the IDEA compels public school systems to initiate appropriate
special education for their disabled students, but this does mean that the
disabled students are “relieved of the burden of proof.”149
The court further reasoned that giving the challenger such an advantage
would undermine the purpose of the IDEA. Since the burden of proof
encompasses the burden of production, if a party with the burden of proof fails
to put forth any evidence in its favor, it will automatically lose.150 The Fourth
Circuit believed that policy dictated putting this burden on the parents: where
no evidence is presented, if the burden is on the school district, then the district
will lose. “To say that the school system should lose is to say that every
challenged IEP is presumptively inadequate. A presumption of inadequacy
would go against a basic policy of the IDEA, which is to rely upon the
professional expertise of local educators.”151
The Fourth Circuit also expressly rejected the argument put forth in Oberti,
which stated that school officials, by reason of their greater expertise and
resources, should be charged with the burden of proving the appropriateness of
an IEP.152 “We do not automatically assign the burden of proof to the side
with the bigger guns.”153 In fact, often the party with fewer resources must
plead and prove a matter even where the adversary has superior access to
proof.154 The court discounted the argument that schools have a “natural
advantage” in litigation, identifying that the IDEA legally involves parents in
the IEP formulation.155 Parents are members of their child’s IEP team, have
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000), as examples of such
legislation).
147. Weast, 377 F.3d at 453.
148. Id.
149. Id. The court rejected the notion that a “favored group” avoids bearing the burden
“merely because a statute confers substantive rights on [it].” Id. (quoting Clyde K. v. Puyallup
Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1994)) (alteration in original).
150. Id. at 455. See discussion supra Part III.A.
151. Weast, 377 F.3d at 455–56 (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 453.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 453–54.
The IDEA and its implementing regulations require an open process that makes relevant
information and special services, such as the independent evaluation, available to parents.
By the time the IEP is finally developed, parents have been provided with substantial
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the right to examine records and other relevant information the school system
uses to develop the IEP, and have the right to participate at meetings relating to
the IEP.156 The court rebuffed the financial burden placed on parents since
they may request an independent evaluation of their child at the school’s
expense.157 In addition, parents receive written notice of their rights
throughout the IEP process and may receive public training with regard to their
rights in protecting their child’s special education.158 The court interpreted
these protections as mechanisms that “level the playing field.”159 Hence,
parents do not need the added protection of having the burden of proof on the
schools.
Brian’s parents advanced another argument to prove that the IDEA
implicitly places the burden of proof on the school district. According to his
parents, Congress’s enactment of the EAHCA codified all of the procedural
blueprints laid out in two early special education cases, Mills v. Board of
Education160 and Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth
(PARC).161, 162 Brian’s parents argued that when Congress responded to the
needs of disabled students by establishing the EAHCA, Congress intentionally
codified all of the principles of Mills and PARC, including their determination
that the burden of proof in litigation lies with the school district.163 The Fourth
Circuit rejected this logic.164 The court held that Congress’s enactment of the

information about their child’s educational situation and prospects. They have continuing
access to information and anticipated evidence once a hearing is requested. In sum,
Congress has taken into account the natural advantage a school system might have in the
IEP process, including the administrative hearing, by providing the explicit protections we
have outlined. As a result, the school system has no unfair information or resource
advantage that compels us to reassign the burden of proof to the school system when the
parents initiate the proceeding.
Id. at 454.
156. Weast, 377 F.3d at 454 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414–15 (2000)).
157. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)).
158. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(d)(1), 1482).
159. Id. at 453.
160. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (outlining numerous procedural requirements a school
district must follow when providing special education).
161. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (approving consent decree in which defendants agreed
to provide free public education to mentally retarded children).
162. Weast, 377 F.3d at 454–55.
163. Id. at 455. Mills and PARC were decided at a time before special education services
were congressionally guaranteed, and they served to lay the framework for necessary
pronouncements from Congress. Id.; see Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192–194 (1982).
According to Brian’s parents’ brief to the Fourth Circuit, “It stands to reason that Congress
intended for the IDEA to echo the[ir] assignments of burden of proof.” Weast, 377 F.3d at 455
(quoting Brief of Appellees at 15, Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 001471)).
164. Weast, 377 F.3d at 455.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

FOLLOW THE TEACHER’S ADVICE

245

EAHCA (now the IDEA) specifically incorporated some of the procedural
guidelines necessary to protect disabled children, but also chose to disregard
others.165 According to the court, if Congress wanted to preserve the burden
placement used in Mills and PARC, Congress could have easily incorporated it
into the Act.166
In sum, the Fourth Circuit refused to read into the IDEA an implicit burden
of proof requirement for school systems.
C. Fourth Circuit’s Dissent
Judge Luttig, in his dissenting opinion, contended that the school board
should always shoulder the burden of proof in IEP challenges.167 The dissent
asserted that the public school system, which is statutorily obligated to provide
free appropriate education to disabled students, is in the best position to ensure
that such appropriate education is granted.168 To Luttig, “comparatively
uninformed parents” do not have enough expertise in a dispute against the
school.169 Based on “policy, convenience and fairness,” the dissent found it
reasonable for school systems to bear the burden of proving the
appropriateness of an IEP.170 The dissent did concede that such an assignment
of burden should only be a rebuttable presumption.171
In challenging the majority’s argument that the IDEA mirrors Title VII, the
ADA, and the ADEA, the dissent asserted that the affirmative obligation of
those statutes is significantly different than the obligation imposed on schools
under the IDEA. Luttig contended that these statutes impress an obligation to
remedy discrimination, whereas the IDEA affirmatively imposes the duty to
provide a beneficial and appropriate service upon school systems.172 It is this

165. Id.
Congress took a number of the procedural safeguards from PARC and Mills and wrote
them directly into the Act. Congress thus knows how to borrow ideas and incorporate
them into legislation. For the Act here, it borrowed some ideas and specifically ignored
others. We cannot conclude from this that Congress intended to adopt the ideas that it
failed to write into the text of the statute. For whatever reason Congress did not assign the
burden of proof, and Congress has not signaled by its silence that we should depart from
the general rule.
Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 457 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (“I would hold that the school district—and not the
comparatively uninformed parents of the disabled child—must bear the burden of proving that the
disabled child has been provided with the statutorily-required appropriate educational
resources.”).
168. Id.
169. Weast, 377 F.3d at 457.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 457–58.
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responsibility—providing disabled students “with an enhanced level of
attention and services”—that dictates a policy toward obliging the schools to
bear the burden.173
The dissent took exception to the majority’s argument that the IDEA
places parents in the same position as schools when it comes to identifying
appropriate education for a child.174 Luttig acknowledged that the IDEA
places resources in the hands of parents, but argued that these parents lack the
requisite expertise necessary to allow them to assess the likely benefits of
available alternatives: “Parents simply do not have, and cannot easily acquire,
the cumulative, institutional knowledge gained by representatives of the school
district from their experiences with other, similarly-disabled children.”175 The
resources made available under the IDEA, while providing some
understanding for parents, do not “level[] the playing field,” the dissent
claimed.176
Under this approach, school officials, thanks to their educational and
continual experiences, have higher levels of expertise in IEP matters and
should be held accountable for their decisions in such matters.
V. ANALYSIS: PLACE THE BURDEN ON THE CHALLENGING PARTY
The rationales presented in Oberti, Lascari, and Judge Luttig’s dissent in
Weast reflect the majority philosophy that places the burden of proof on the

173. Id. at 458.
174. Weast, 377 F.3d at 458 (“While individual parents may have insight into the educational
development of their own children, they lack the comprehensive understanding of the educational
alternatives available to disabled children in the school district that officials of the school system
possess.”).
175. Id. at 458. The dissent concluded that the majority overstated the average knowledge
and expertise of most parents when challenging their child’s education. The dissent worried that
the majority’s overvaluation may be clouded because Brian’s parents “have proven to be
knowledgeable about the educational resources available to their son and sophisticated (if yet
unsuccessful) in their pursuit of these resources.” Id. Because most parents are not as
knowledgeable as Brian’s parents, policy considerations suggested assigning the burden of proof
to the party with greater access to resources and an elevated level of expertise. Id.
176. Id.; see Engel, supra note 51, at 189, 193–94 (noting that parental input tends to be
misinformed and that parental knowledge and recommendations carry less weight than
professional knowledge and recommendations during the IEP process). Engel further asserts why
school officials curry greater expertise:
The parents hold tenuously to the due process protections of the [IDEA], although they
generally have neither the understanding nor the inclination to invoke them. The school
district personnel are more confident, usually wielding superior political power—the
capacity to define the problem, to dictate the language used to discuss the child, to
intimidate, to retaliate, or to ignore.
Id. at 203.
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school district at due process hearings.177 These influential opinions declared
that a school, with its administrative expertise, must be held responsible to
parents by obliging it to prove the adequacy of an IEP.178 As McKenzie
identified, the many procedural obligations imposed upon school districts
under the IDEA evidence congressional intent to protect disabled students.179
These opinions all placed the burden of proof on the party with the “bigger
guns.”180 They justified such burden-placement on fairness principles,
burdening the public school district because of its greater access to resources
and its obligation under the IDEA to provide all of its students with free
appropriate education.181
Nevertheless, the decisions of Tatro and Weast exercised sound arguments
that favored assigning the burden of proof to the parents, or at the very least, to
the challenging party.182 These decisions held that charging the school district
with the burden of proof effectively presumes all IEPs to be inadequate.183
However, to these courts, this conclusion was wholly at odds with the IDEA’s
deference to professional expertise and parental involvement.184 Moreover,
this view saw no reason to depart from the generally accepted principle that the
party initiating a proceeding, or challenging a ruling, should suffer the burden
of persuasion.185 According to the Fourth Circuit, had Congress wanted to
depart from this procedural standard, it would have explicitly done so when it
drafted the IDEA.186 Significantly, the Weast opinion made clear that the
Fourth Circuit disagreed with the majority belief that parents are disadvantaged
when challenging an IEP.187
Determining which party should carry the burden of proof in a dispute over
the adequacy of an IEP requires reconciling several competing policy
considerations. For instance, should deference toward the expertise of the
school system point toward the presumption of an appropriate IEP? Or,
conversely, should this very same deference lead toward charging the school
district with the burden of affirming its expertise? Do the procedural
safeguards provided to parents under the IDEA imply that Congress sought to
177. See discussion supra Parts III.B, IV.C. For a brief summary of the Lascari opinion, see
supra note 69.
178. See discussion supra Parts III.B, IV.C.
179. See discussion supra Parts III.B.3.
180. Weast, 377 F.3d at 453 (majority); See discussion supra Parts III.B, IV.C.
181. See discussion supra Parts III.B, IV.C.
182. See discussion supra Parts III.C, IV.B.
183. See discussion supra Parts III.C, IV.B.
184. See discussion supra Parts III.C, IV.B.
185. See discussion supra Parts III.C, IV.B.
186. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 455 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
187. Id. at 454 (“[T]he school system has no information or resource advantage that compels
us to reassign the burden of proof to the school system when the parents initiate [a due process
hearing.]”).
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protect parents by ensuring that the burden of proof not be placed with them?
Or, on the other hand, did Congress intentionally not place the burden of proof
on parents when it chose how to protect disabled students and their parents?
Finally, does fairness require placing the burden of proof on school districts
because they have better access to resources and finances when litigating? Or,
has the IDEA sufficiently leveled the playing field, giving parents adequate
access to information and expertise? Resolution of such questions is necessary
before allocating the burden of proof to either party at the state administrative
proceedings, as well as at the district court level.
The following Sections explore the three major overriding questions that
must be answered when choosing which party should carry the burden of
proof: (1) What are the implications on burden of proof when giving deference
to school administrative expertise? (2) How should Congress’s omission of a
burden placement be interpreted? (3) Do school districts possess greater
weapons than parents when litigating the appropriateness of an IEP? To fairly
resolve the underlying issues, a burden-shifting analysis should be established:
At due process hearings, school districts should bear a burden of production,
but the challenging party should maintain the ultimate burden of persuasion.
Then, the party challenging the ALJ’s determination should be forced to carry
the entire burden of proof at federal court.
A.

School Administrative Expertise

A necessary question that must be answered when deciding which party
should bear the burden of proof involves the deference owed to the expertise of
school officials. Should a child’s education be presumptively adequate
because school experts made the primary determination of services to be
administered? As noted above, proponents of placing the burden on the school
district argue that deference to school officials’ expertise should not translate
into a presumption of appropriateness regarding an IEP.188 Rather, the experts’
work should not go unchecked. For example, the district court in Weast, when
assigning the burden to the school district, held that “it would seem entirely
reasonable to assign the burden to the school authority to affirmatively
establish the propriety of its plan.”189 The court asserted that such
accountability does not show a lack of deference toward the expertise of school
officials.190 Instead, the court found it entirely consistent to acknowledge the
expertise of school officials and still require the school to demonstrate to an
impartial ALJ that the proposed IEP addresses the individual student’s

188. See supra Parts III.B, IV.C.
189. Brian S. v. Vance, 86 F. Supp. 2d 538, 544 (D. Md. 2000), vacated, Schaffer ex rel.
Schaffer v. Vance, No. 00-1471, 2001 WL 22920, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 2001).
190. Id.
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needs.191 Similarly, Judge Luttig, in his dissent in Weast, opined that the IDEA
“imposes an affirmative obligation on the nation’s school systems to provide
disabled students with an enhanced level of attention and services.”192 To
Luttig, this affirmative obligation included the school board’s duty to
demonstrate the adequacy of the IEP at the due process challenge.193 These
opinions stressed Congress’s objective of ensuring appropriate, special,
individual education to disabled students; presuming the adequacy of an IEP
undercuts such a goal.
On the other side, those siding with the schools argue that the expertise
school personnel possess should lead to deference toward the IEP they
design.194 As the Fourth Circuit declared, “Congress enacted the IDEA with
the clear intention of deferring to local school authorities for the development
of educational plans for disabled children.”195 This view not only presumes an
IEP to be appropriate because it was drafted by special education experts, but
also because the child’s parents were included as part of the IEP team.196
Because special education teachers as well as the child’s parents and other
assistants all collaborate in drawing the IEP, “it is reasonable to require parents
attacking the terms of an IEP to bear the burden of showing why it is
deficient.”197
A burden-shifting approach at the due process hearing would address the
policy considerations framed by both points of view above. Both sides agree
that deference should be accorded to the expertise of school officials.
Assigning an initial burden of production to the school district would solve the
concern that an IEP is presumptively adequate without evidence supporting it.
However, giving the school authorities the due deference they deserve, the
school should only need to meet this initial burden of producing evidence
supporting its plan.198 Once the school offers some support for the

191. Id.
192. Weast, 377 F.3d at 458.
193. Id.
194. See supra Parts III.C, IV.B.
195. Weast, 377 F.3d at 456 (majority).
196. Id. at 456 (noting that Congress entrusts a disabled child’s special education to public
schools under the IDEA, but it also provides for parental involvement and assistance in the
formulation of a child’s IEP).
197. Id.
198. In practice, this initial burden of production should almost always be met without issue
by the district. The IDEA requires, as part of the IEP, that the IEP team turn over its documented
methods of examination and determinations to the child’s parents. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4)(B)
(2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 614, 118 Stat. 2647, 2705 (2004). Thus, the school’s
evidence must be produced anyway and should be readily available.
For a Seventh Circuit case that instructs ALJs to give due deference to a school’s finding
of appropriateness, without declaring which party bears the burden of proof before the ALJ, see
Sch. Dist. v. Z.S., 295 F.3d 671, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2002).
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appropriateness of the IEP, the burden of persuasion should then shift to the
challenger. The burden of persuasion only becomes a factor where both sides
have produced evidence and the fact-finder is not persuaded by either side.199
Thus, the ultimate burden of persuasion will only come into play if the school
district’s proof and the parents’ proof are equal. In accordance with the
general rule that the challenger should bear the burden, and out of respect for
the IEP drawn mutually by parents and teachers, the final burden of proof
should rest with the parents (if they initiated the proceeding). It is also entirely
reasonable to hold the losing party at the administrative proceeding responsible
for contesting the ALJ’s determination. If the school loses at the state level,
the school should then be forced to bear the burden of persuasion in federal
court. After all, deference should also be given to the ALJ’s finding.200
B.

Congress’s Omission of Burden of Proof in the IDEA

The Supreme Court in Rowley noted that the IDEA purports to give a child
with disability appropriate education that is “reasonably calculated to enable
the child” to receive educational benefits.201 The Supreme Court also
recognized that the IDEA sets up several procedural benchmarks that help to
ensure such educational benefits are received.202 Yet, Congress did not assign
the procedural issue of burden of proof to a specific party in special education
litigation.203 An important query, then, is whether Congress intended the
procedural guidelines to suggest that the heavy burden placed on school
districts means the districts must also carry an implied burden of proof in due
process hearings and federal court challenges. Or, as the Fourth Circuit held,
are the procedural requirements the only obligations for school districts with
respect to an IEP? In other words, does Congress’s omission of a burden
assignment on the school district imply that Congress did not want such an
assignment to occur?204
Administrative law judges in Wisconsin who hear IDEA cases are, we grant, specialists,
and are not required to accept supinely whatever school officials testify to. But they have
to give that testimony due weight. . . . A particular Individualized Education Program, to
survive administrative review . . . need only be “reasonably calculated to enable the child
to receive educational benefits.”
Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1952)) (internal citations omitted).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68.
200. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
201. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204.
202. See discussion supra Part II.B.
203. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 450 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005).
204. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees Urging
Affirmance at 12, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Vance, 2 Fed. App’x. 232 (4th Cir. 2001) (No. 001471), 2000 WL 33991818 [hereinafter Brief for United States] (“Having to carry the burden of
proof regarding the adequacy of its proposed IEP is consistent with the school’s existing statutory
duties under the IDEA to provide FAPE and should not substantially increase the workload for
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Judge Luttig’s dissent to Weast and the New Jersey state court decision of
Lascari interpret the IDEA’s many procedural obligations as evidence of
Congress’s intent that the burden of proof should fall on the school district.205
“[T]he policies behind the IDEA indisputably argue in favor of placing the
burden of proof with the school district.”206 Under such an approach, the many
procedural requirements that school officials must follow in order to provide
appropriate education suggest the inference that schools should also shoulder
other procedural safeguards not necessarily outlined in the IDEA. In fact, the
argument was even asserted that all of the procedural principles of PARC and
Mills have impliedly been incorporated into the IDEA.207
But as the Weast court notes, the omission regarding burden of proof is
consistent with other pieces of major legislation.208 The Supreme Court has
interpreted those statutes to place the burden on the party seeking the
protection of the law.209 In special education cases, the parents and student are
seeking appropriate special education guaranteed them under the IDEA.
According to Weast, Congressional silence with respect to burden of proof
indicates that courts should not depart from the general rule that “a party who
initiates a proceeding to obtain relief based on a statutory obligation bears the
burden of proof.”210
Assigning the burden of production to the school and the burden of
persuasion to the parents reasonably reconciles the opposing interpretations of
the IDEA. Requiring the school district to put forth some evidence in support
of the IEP, at the very least, adds another procedural directive under the IDEA.
However, parents should be forced to carry the burden of persuasion because
they are seeking the protection of the IDEA. If Congress intended to depart
from the general practice of putting the burden on the party seeking protection

the school.”), with Brief of Amici Curiae Maryland Ass’n of Boards of Education & National
School Boards Ass’n at 5, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Vance, 2 Fed. App’x. 232 (4th Cir. 2001)
(No. 00-1471), 2000 WL 33991819 (“Although IDEA provides numerous due process protections
for parents, the assignment of the burden of proof to the school system is not one of them.
Absent statutory authority, administrative law judges should follow the generally accepted rule
requiring the party bringing a claim to bear the burden of proof.”).
205. See discussion supra Part IV.C, note 69.
206. Weast, 377 F.3d at 457 (Luttig, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 172–
73; Brian S. v. Vance, 86 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543 (D. Md. 2000), vacated, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer
v. Vance, No. 00-1471, 2001 WL 22920, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 2001) (“Like [the] procedural
safeguards, the allocation of the burden of proof protects the rights of handicapped children to an
appropriate education.”).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63.
208. Weast, 377 F.3d at 453.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 455.
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of the Act, Congress should have included the provision.211 Thus, giving the
school a small burden increases its procedural requirements; but the parents
still must satisfy the ultimate burden at the administrative proceeding. Again,
no valid reasoning under this Section justifies requiring any party but the
losing party to carry the burden in federal court.212
C. Level Playing Field
A fairness exception exists to the general rule that the party initiating a
proceeding or seeking the protection of a statute maintains the burden of proof.
As the Fourth Circuit conceded in Weast, “[F]actors such as policy
considerations, convenience, and fairness may allow for a different allocation
of the burden of proof.”213 It is thus necessary to determine whether school
districts possess resources that parents cannot access when litigating an IEP
dispute. If so, the goal of fairness would dictate that the burden of proof
should be properly be on the school.
The majority of circuits have held that the burden of proof should be
placed on the school district in order to fairly mitigate the advantages school
districts possess in IEP battles with parents.214 In an amicus brief, filed in
support of parents, on behalf of the United States, the U.S. General Counsel
argued that schools are in a better position to shoulder the burden because they
possess “superior knowledge of the facts” and control “the relevant
information needed to decide the dispute.”215 The Third Circuit, in Oberti,
recognized this apparent imbalance of resources when it placed the burden on
the parents,216 and Judge Luttig in his Weast dissent asserted that “[p]arents
simply do not have, and cannot easily acquire, the cumulative, institutional
knowledge gained by representatives of the school district from their
experiences with other, similarly-disabled children.”217
On the other hand, proponents of placing the burden with the parents argue
that the IDEA has effectively leveled the playing field. These decisions
recognized that under the IDEA, parents are fully informed about their child’s
educational plight and are granted access to all resources available to the
schools. Parents are permitted and encouraged to participate in the IEP
formulation and are entitled to an independent evaluation of their child at the

211. As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, Congress “knows how to borrow ideas and
incorporate them into legislation. For [the IDEA], it borrowed some ideas and specifically
ignored others. . . . For whatever reason Congress did not assign the burden of proof . . . .” Id.
212. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
213. Weast, 377 F.3d at 452.
214. See discussion supra Parts III.B, IV.C.
215. Brief for United States, supra note 204, at 13.
216. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
217. Weast, 377 F.3d at 458.
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district’s expense.218 The majority in Weast noticed that Congress has taken
into account the natural advantage a school system might have over a parent in
the IEP and has provided the parents with explicit protections.219 “As a result,”
the court declared, “the school system has no unfair information or resource
advantage . . . .”220
The Fourth Circuit position that Congress has effectively closed the
resource disparity between parents and schools is well grounded. While
parents may not have the same overall experience and knowledge as schools,
the IDEA grants to parents substantial opportunity to actively participate in the
IEP process. Under the IDEA, parents are guaranteed the ability to “examine
all records relating to such child and to participate in meetings with respect to
the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child . . . .”221
Parents are not to be excluded from their child’s IEP team and are to receive
notice of all evaluations.222 Importantly, the IEP team must take into
consideration existing evaluation data on the child, including evaluations and
information provided by the parents of the child.223 What is more, parents
maintain the right to obtain, at the expense of the district, an independent
educational evaluation of their child and a preliminary impartial mediation
even before the due process hearing.224
Conceding that not all parents will become experts with respect to the
educational resources available to them, the better position is still to place the
ultimate burden of persuasion on them. By the time the parents’ challenge
reaches an ALJ, the parents have been granted a funded independent
evaluation of their child and have presented their case before an impartial
mediator. It makes more sense to burden the parents, as the challenger, with
the ultimate responsibility of proof by the time the issue reaches an ALJ.
Nevertheless, schools still should be forced to present some evidence in their
favor before an IEP presumably becomes appropriate.

218. See supra text accompanying notes 154–159.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 154–159.
220. Weast, 377 F.3d at 454.
221. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 615, 118 Stat. 2647,
2716 (2004).
222. Id. §§ 1414(b)(1), (d)(1)(B), amended by § 614, 118 Stat. at 2704, 2709. Parents of
disabled students should be motivated to take advantage of the many resources available to them.
See Phyllis Coulter, Expert: Be Your Child’s Advocate: Experienced Parent Gives Special Ed
Advice, PANTAGRAPH, Jan. 29, 2005, at A3 (reporting the advice of a mother of a 21-year-old
disabled student and now a regional training coordinator for Family Matters Parent Training and
Information Center: “Parents are vital to the individualized education plan, and they have to be
knowledgeable about the system and prepared to make the decisions about what is best for their
children”).
223. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2), amended by § 614, 118 Stat. at 2704–05.
224. See id.§ 1415(b)(6), (e)(1), amended by § 615, 118 Stat. at 2716, 2719.
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Because both parties essentially carry the same guns to the ALJ, the ALJ’s
determination should be granted deference. The losing party should then be
assigned the burden of proving a defect in the ALJ’s determination.225
D. December 2004 Changes to the IDEA
It must be acknowledged that as this Note was drafted, Congress enacted
changes to the IDEA. However, this recent development in the special
education law supports the conclusion that the challenging party should bear
the final burden of persuasion. In December 2004, Congress passed into law
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (Improvement
Act)226 to amend the IDEA. The Improvement Act again did not address the
assignment of the burden of proof in IEP challenges. Still, the amendments
tend to confirm that the challenger should be responsible for proving the
inappropriateness of an IEP.
The Improvement Act obliges a party challenging an IEP to give notice of
all issues prior to the due process hearing or risk not having the issue
addressed.227 This requirement affirms Congress’s intent that the party seeking
the protection of the IDEA carries responsibilities. Also, the new amendments
call for a meeting fifteen days before the administrative proceeding, list
options for state-funded mediation with a qualified and impartial mediator, and
give an option to parents to meet with a disinterested party to encourage the
use of such mediation.228 Furthermore, the Improvement Act imposes liability
on attorneys for the costs of frivolous lawsuits.229 It appears that Congress
intends due process hearings to be administered only when necessary. Thus,
the party choosing to still attack an IEP after a preliminary meeting and
mediation should be forced to prove its case.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Weast v. Schaffer, and the subsequent
affirmance by the Supreme Court, properly assign to the challenging party the
burden of persuasion at IDEA-related due process hearings. However, a more
fair and reasonable solution would be to create a burden-shifting approach that
225. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
226. Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004).
227. Id. § 615, 118 Stat. at 2722; see NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, supra note
61.
228. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615, 118 Stat. at 2719–
21; NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, supra note 61.
229. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act § 615, 118 Stat. at 2724; see
NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, supra note 61; HOUSE EDUCATION & THE
WORKFORCE COMMITTEE, FACT SHEET: SPECIAL EDUCATION REFORM: SUPPORTING TEACHERS
& SCHOOLS, PROVIDING NEW CHOICES FOR PARENTS & STUDENTS (2004),
http://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/108th/education/idea/1350factsheet.htm.
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places the initial burden of production at the hearing on the school district. In
deference to the school officials’ expertise, once the school has produced
sufficient evidence supporting its plan, the IEP should then be presumed
adequate. The challenging party (whether it is the school or parents) should
then be dealt the decisive burden of persuasion. The losing party should be
forced to prove its disagreement with the ALJ’s determination in federal court.
This approach defeats the presumption of an appropriate IEP without more, but
sticks to the general principle that a party initiating a proceeding, and seeking
the protection of a statute, bears the burden of persuasion.
JORDAN D. SCHNITZER*
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